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Business Groups Reconsidered: Beyond Paragons and Parasites 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the potential paths of Business Group’s (BGs) evolution. We organize 
our analysis around the two dominant perspectives on BGs: institutional voids (IV) and 
entrenchment/exploitation (EE). We suggest that the empirical evidence does not entirely support 
either perspective, and neither fully predicts what we sometimes observe; namely that BGs not 
only persist and thrive, but also sometimes do so as internationally competitive firms. This 
indicates that a more contextualized approach is required, and we propose a conceptual 
framework that can guide future thinking. In so doing, we take explicit account of two key 
factors relevant to the dynamics of BG evolution: the state’s capacity to create market-supporting 
institutions and the ability of business groups to adapt to evolving institutions. Our framework 
accommodates the possibility of multiple outcomes, including ones consistent with the IV and 
EE perspectives, but also ones  consistent with the internationalization of BGs, including those 
from emerging markets.  
 
Keywords: business groups, institutional voids, role of the state, group adaptation  
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Introduction  
 
Business groups (BGs) are multi-business entities defined as “a collection of firms bound 
together in some formal and informal ways” (Granovetter, 1994: 454); and though the entities 
are legally independent, they are “accustomed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna & Rivkin, 
2001: 47). Although BGs have existed for over 100 years (Jones & Wale, 1998), they have most 
recently been associated with emerging markets, where they sometimes account for more than a 
half of their national output2. According to Khanna and Yafeh (2007), the fraction of group-
affiliated firms in these countries is substantial, with their prevalence varying from 25% of 
publicly listed firms in the Philippines to 65% in Indonesia (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002). It is 
the loose ties between BG affiliated firms that distinguish them from the typical Western 
corporation. In advanced European and North American economies, diversified businesses have 
been tightly organized into multidivisional structures described as the M-form (Williamson, 
1975; Chandler, 1990). Coordination in the M-form occurs through the unified internal control of 
multiple business units,but in BGs it relies on an intricate network of formal and informal control 
mechanisms, such as kinship relationships among senior managers (Granovetter, 2005) or a 
dense web of commercial and financial linkages (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).  
The BG phenomenon began to attract the interest of scholars from a variety of disciplines 
in the mid-1970s, and has been characterized from the outset by considerable disagreement over 
BG efficiency and performance. Table 1 provides a succinct overview of BG research streams to 
                                                 
2 They are known as Grupos Económicos in Latin America (Strachan, 1976), Chaebols in South Korea (Chang & 
Choi, 1998), Qiye Jituan in mainland China (Keister, 1998), Hongs in Hong Kong (Wong, 1996), Guanxiqiye in 
Taiwan (Numazaki, 1996), and General Corporations in Vietnam (Abegaz, 2005). In South Asia, they are closely 
identified with their founding families and known as Business Houses in India (Encarnation, 1989) or Big Houses in 
Pakistan (Papenek, 1972). In Russia and Ukraine, they are identified through the group founders (oligarchs) and are 
popularly described as Oligarchic Firms (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001). 
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date from the fields of business history, development studies, strategy, finance, economics, 
organization theory, and management. It reports the principal findings from each of the main 
phases of research about BGs; phases that are identified based on the different forms, locations 
and time periods studied. In the early literature, business historians viewed 19th-century 
Japanese and Western business groups as prototype multinational enterprises that would 
disappear in competition with the more robustly integrated multinationals organized on the M-
form principal (Jones, 2000; Morikawa, 1992). While scholars have long recognized BGs 
capacity to solve problems associated with scarce credit and the lack of managerial and 
entrepreneurial talent in developing economies (Leff, 1978; Khanna, 2000), they have also been 
concerned that BGs create other, potentially more serious, problems of entrenched monopoly 
power, which has recently come to be known as “cronyism” (Leff, 1979)3.  
Similarly, in the 1980s and early 1990s, many sociologists and management theorists 
viewed Asian BGs as a flexible and dynamic structure and a vital element of the Asian economic 
miracle, while others grew increasingly critical of BGs because of their perceived self-serving 
behavior following the 1990s Asian financial crisis. As reported in Table 1, comparable debates 
concerning the efficiency and economic impact of BGs have taken place in other emerging 
economies, including Turkey, Russia, China, and India. Strategy, finance, and organization 
research on BGs has accelerated in the past 20 years, but these conflicting claims about their 
economic and social value have not disappeared and indeed have perhaps become even more 
acute, leaving “long-standing debates” regarding BG efficiency and impact (Holmes, Hoskisson, 
Kim, Wan and Holcomb, 2016: 1). 
                                                 
3 Indeed, one of the earliest works on developing country BGs (Strachan, 1976) proposed a life-cycle model of 
group development noting that Nicaragua’s groups were dynamic at their founding, but lapsed into rent-seeking as 
they aged. 
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------Table 1 about Here----- 
We summarize the contemporary rendering of this long-standing debate about the impact 
of BGs by organizing our discussion around two prominent theoretical perspectives: the 
institutional voids (IV) perspective (e.g. Khanna, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a; Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007) and the entrenchment/exploitation (EE) perspective (e.g. Fogel, 2006; Morck, 
Wolfenzon & Yeung, 2005; Young et al., 2008) respectively. In the literature, they are often 
positioned as polar opposites, memorably described by Khanna and Yafeh (2007) as “paragons 
or parasites”. IV views BGs as an efficient organizational response to institutional 
underdevelopment while EE sees BGs as opaque structures designed to extract surplus from 
shareholders, government and workers to the benefit of their owners. However, as we document 
in Table 1 and discuss further below, while the literature provides empirical evidence supporting 
both perspectives, there is also evidence that does not support either of them. Based on this 
evidence, we argue that the underlying issues are too complex to be well captured by any simple 
dichotomization and any framing of them as dichotomous is too coarse.  We therefore propose a 
new and richer conceptual framework to guide future thinking, designed to provide a more 
contextualized understanding of the various ways that BGs evolve through time under alternative 
host country conditions. Importantly, our framework encompasses, amongst others, both the IV 
and EE perspectives. 
We begin by presenting a summary of the IV and EE perspectives focusing on their 
potentially contradictory implications with respect to the effects of BG affiliation on firm 
behaviour, profitability and internationalization; and the degree of BG prevalence notably its 
impact on national economic performance. We find considerable heterogeneity across countries 
in terms of prevalence, persistence and performance of BGs, and argue that one cannot fully 
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explain, using these perspectives, the evidence that in some countries BGs persist and thrive over 
time, and do so as internationally competitive firms. We conclude that the evolution of BGs in a 
particular country will depend primarily on two key factors: the way that the institutions of the 
home country, particularly those associated with the state, evolve, and on the adaptability of 
firms in response to these changes. 
We first distinguish between strong and weak states based on the state’s capacity to 
create market supporting institutions. We propose that this distinction will in large part depend 
upon the nature of the government’s relationship with business elites and how this evolves over 
time. In contrast, BGs’ ability to adapt in different institutional contexts depends on their internal 
organisational and technological capacities to evolve as markets mature. We conceive BG 
adaptability to be reflected in their development of proprietary organizational and technological 
capabilities that are reflected in their  product-market and international positioning. We identify 
three prominent forms of adaptation: refocusing, internationalization, and institutional escape. 
Contrarily, because some BGs clearly do fail and are dismantled we also identify three 
syndromes of non-adaptability which we label: collapse/absorption, contingent value, and 
capture. 
 Consistent with the evidence of heterogeneity in BG impact and evolution, our 
conceptualization encompasses several potential equilibrium outcomes, including ones that are 
consistent with the IV or EE views, but also ones that allow for the possibility that BGs can 
progress from their initial role of substituting for missing institutions to become internationally 
competitive firms. This latter equilibrium includes the development of emerging market 
multinationals (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014). Our framework provides a road map for 
understanding how state policy can influence the evolution of BGs by shaping their institutional 
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and regulatory environment as well as possibilities for future research and the strategic 
implications for BGs managers. 
In sum, our approach recognises the evident diversity in the way BGs evolve and relate to 
their institutional context. We take as our starting point an older review of the BG literature by 
Granovetter (2005: 445), who calls for scholars “to look closely at how BGs have responded to 
changes in the economies they inhabit and how we understand their capacities and the way they 
change over time”. In so doing, we differentiate our paper from two other recent BG review 
papers. Colli & Colpan (2016) address the ‘diverse and fragmented’ literature on BG corporate 
governance; Holmes, Hoskisson, Kim, Wan & Holcombe (2016) survey the international 
business, strategic management and entrepreneurship literatures for insights on BG international 
strategy. However, our focus is somewhat broader: by addressing Granovetter’s call we consider 
the evident persistence of the BG form and the implied capacity of BGs to adapt over time in 
divergent institutional settings. We therefore focus on both how BGs have evolved over time, but 
also on how the multidisciplinary literature on BGs has evolved in its treatment of the BG 
phenomenon. 
Comparing Institutional Voids and Entrenchment/Exploitation Perspectives 
In this section, we compare the IV and EE perspectives with a particular emphasis on the 
different empirical implications of each. We consider their evaluations of the benefits and costs 
of BG affiliation as well as their predictions about the likely path of BG evolution over time and 
the impact of BG prevalence on key measures of national economic performance.  
The literature concerning the performance effects of BG affiliation is extensive (e.g., 
Bhaumik, Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2016; Carney et al., 2011; Claessens, Fan & Lang, 2006; Colli 
& Colpan, 2016; Estrin, Poukliakova & Shapiro, 2009; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Morck, 
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Wolfeson & Yeung, 2005), and includes tests of specific predictions of the IV and EE 
perspectives. Although these studies are of considerable significance in understanding the two 
perspectives, the questions of whether BGs remain prevalent or fade away as economies become 
more developed, and whether high levels of BG prevalence negatively affect national economic 
growth and other indicators of business performance, are less well understood.  
---------------------Table 2 about here------------------ 
Commencing with the impact of BGs, the main arguments of each perspective are 
presented in Table 2. In the IV perspective, BGs are viewed as a functional response to an 
underdeveloped institutional context, and one that enhances economic performance of affiliated 
firms. Thus, BGs are created to fill voids in the market-supporting infrastructure and to enable 
the acquisition of resources that would be otherwise unavailable via arms-length contracting 
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). However, BG affiliation is also seen to have attendant costs, 
comparable to those facing diversified M-form firms where bureaucratic coordination costs rise 
as the number of affiliated firms increases (Hoskisson et al., 2005). In addition, with the 
development of market-supporting institutions, arms-length contracting becomes more feasible 
and the benefits of group affiliation erode (Hoskisson, et al., 2005). As a result, it is expected that 
BGs will gradually focus, restructure, and loosen their ties; ultimately, they should unravel and 
disappear. This occurs because in a more developed economy, market-based transactions become 
increasingly efficient and cheaper providers of the necessary resources and capabilities, relative 
to quasi-hierarchical provision under the BG umbrella. With this scenario, group affiliation 
should progressively decrease because it will be more profitable for firms to be unaffiliated than 
affiliated as institutional and economic development proceeds (Hoskisson et al., 2005; Kim et al., 
2010; Lee et al., 2008). Khanna and Palepu summarize the view that BGs are a transitional 
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phenomenon by offering the following policy advice: “Governments in developing countries 
must focus on building up those market institutions in the long term. The dismantling of business 
groups will, we believe, follow naturally once these institutions are in place” (1999: 126).  
In contrast, the EE perspective is less positive. The pyramidal structures and opaque 
governance of BGs (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, 2002) are depicted as being designed for 
self-dealing among related parties (Jia, Shi & Wang, 2013). This leads to the transfer of profits 
among units to the benefit of ultimate owners, so called ‘tunneling’ (Bae, Kang & Lee, 2002; 
Masulis, Phan & Zein, 2011; Siegel & Choudhury, 2012), and to minority investor expropriation 
as profits are redirected within the group (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, 2002; Young et al., 
2008). The EE literature at times characterizes BGs as being formed or facilitated by states in 
order to orchestrate a ‘big push’ toward industrial modernization (Morck, Wolfeson & Yeung, 
2005). However, dominant BGs are argued to exploit their monopoly power and government 
contacts to entrench themselves and enrich their owners. Subsequently, these elite incumbents 
seek to defend their sources of rents by supporting the conditions that initially favored their 
economic and social prominence. Moreover, the concentration of economic power in the hands 
of rent-seeking business owners will have a variety of negative consequences for the national 
economy (Morck, Wolfeson & Yeung, 2005).  Thus, while BGs may first appear where 
institutions are weak, they rarely disappear, but rather gain ‘eternal life’4 (Morck, 2010). For 
example, given their important role in the economy and the resulting political powers and 
relationships, BGs can sustain themselves into the long term, i.e., achieve a stable equilibrium 
                                                 
4
 The singular exception is the total disappearance of BGs as an organisational form which occurred in the US 
following the enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935), and targeted BGs through 
intercorporate dividend taxation (Morck, 2010). The dismantling of Japanese family owned business groups 
(Zaibatsu) by the post-1945 US occupation administration did not lead to the ultimate disappearance of Japan’s BGs 
which quickly reappeared in the early 1950s in the guise of Keiretsu. 
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(Schneider, 2009). Indeed, prominent groups may ‘capture’ the state (Fogel, 2006), and in some 
cases tycoons become politicians (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009). As such, they 
can persist over very long periods of time, successfully resisting entry from foreign firms or 
domestic entrepreneurs (Byun, Lee, & Park, 2012) and continuing to extract surpluses from 
minority shareholders and other potential stakeholders, with negative consequences for national 
economic development and growth.  
 There are some similarities between the EE view on prevalence and performance and 
certain literature in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) tradition (Hall & Soskice, 2001). The VoC 
views BG prevalence as an outcome of complementarities between the state, labour, and 
corporate elites (Schneider, 2009). BGs are constructed at the early stages of country 
development to address national economic coordination problems, but these relationships 
become locked in and foreclose the emergence of new complementarities, such as arms-length 
contracting and flexible labour markets as the economy becomes more developed (Schneider, 
2009). BG prevalence will therefore be associated with negative national economic performance 
effects through a ‘crowding out’ mechanism, in which the dominance of a single organizational 
form limits the evolution of diversity and economic specialization in the economy, an argument 
articulated by Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006). In this view, the mere existence of BGs may 
hamper the emergence of alternative corporate forms by depriving them of niches in which to 
specialize, and these negative effects will be amplified when BGs are highly prevalent5.  
                                                 
5 Thus, if too many firms are group affiliated, competitive selection processes will be muted, and BGs will crowd 
out more specialized forms of organization and so dampen the incentives to develop the firm-specific capabilities 
required for international competitiveness. Hence economies with a high prevalence of BGs can become caught in 
the middle-income trap, where a country's economic growth stagnates or slows after reaching middle-income levels 
(Gomez, 2006; Schneider, 2010).   
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Assessing the Evidence on BGs 
 We focus on two main areas of evidence that arise from the differences between the IV 
and EE perspectives, which are summarized in Table 2. First, we discuss the evidence on 
affiliated firm behaviour and performance, including the recent literature on the impact of 
affiliation on the ability of BGs or their affiliates to compete internationally. Second, we examine 
the literature on the BG prevalence, its persistence over time and the impact of BGs on the 
national economy.  
BG Affiliation: Are There Benefits of Being a Part of a BG?  
The IV perspective suggests the following: BG affiliation positively affects firm 
performance when institutions are weak. However, as institutional voids are filled and host 
economy institutions strengthen, the advantages of BGs are reduced and they may wither away: 
BGs will become less prevalent as institutions develop. In contrast, the EE perspective sees BGs 
as rent-seeking exploiters of market failures, used to expropriate profits for their owners, so BG 
affiliation will likely not be associated with superior performance. Moreover, BGs become 
entrenched so that BGs will not become less prevalent as institutions develop; indeed, BGs may 
impede development, perpetuating ‘second best institutions’ (Rodrik, 2008) and limiting the 
competitive evolution of the economy.  
The first question to answer is therefore the following: In what ways does BG 
membership influence the behavior and performance of affiliated companies? There is a 
considerable body of research on this topic at the firm level, primarily by considering financial 
and economic performance of affiliated compared with  unaffiliated firms (e.g. Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; see Table 1). We draw in particular on a recent meta-analysis of 141 
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primary studies of BGs affiliates’ financial performance in 28 jurisdictions to summarize this 
evidence (Carney et al., 2011). The study concludes that BG affiliation has no significant effect 
on market-based measures of performance, but is negatively related to accounting measures of 
performance. Taken together, this evidence does not support the IV perspective. However, 
Carney and his colleagues also discover substantial heterogeneity in outcomes, suggesting the 
presence of institutional moderating effects. Thus, the IV hypothesis is found to hold in 
jurisdictions at an intermediate state of institutional development (e.g., India, Israel, South 
Africa, and Turkey). The IV hypothesis does not hold in jurisdictions with very low levels of 
institutional development (e.g., Nigeria, Pakistan, and Peru), where the performance effect of BG 
affiliation is substantially negative and contrarily, the value of affiliation is sometimes 
substantially positive in jurisdictions with very high levels of institutional development (e.g., 
Hong Kong, Sweden, and Singapore). At the same time, much recent evidence suggests that 
internal markets for capital (Almeida, Kim & Kim, 2015; Buchuk, Larrain, Muñoz, & Urzúa, 
2014; Boutina et al., 2013; Masulis, Phan & Zein, 2011) and labor (Cestone et al, 2016) may be 
efficient. Nevertheless, despite its large volume, the empirical evidence provides only qualified 
support for the IV view and is in fact far from conclusive with respect to the financial benefits of 
BG affiliation.  
Similarly, in a recent survey of BGs and corporate governance, Colli and Colpin (2016) 
review the finance literature with respect to pyramidal ownership structures, an important 
element of the EE perspective. They suggest that although there is evidence supporting the view 
that pyramidal ownership structures in BGs can negatively impact minority shareholders, for 
example, through tunneling (Masulis et al., 2011; Siegel & Choudhury, 2012), they conclude that 
“the research question is not entirely resolved” (Colli & Colpin, 2016: 294). Thus, evidence 
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supporting the EE view is also mixed. This lack of resolution has led Carney and his colleagues 
to recommend that future research should “eschew monotheoretical accounts characterizing a 
business group in singular terms… (either) an extraction device for wealthy families or a 
generalized response to chronic institutional failure... since these characterizations likely divert 
attention away from their evident structural and strategic complexity” (Carney et al., 2011: 454).  
 Research originating since 2005 has focused on another important dimension of firm 
adaptability and performance: BG internationalization. Neither the IV nor the EE perspective 
can easily explain the pheonomenon of BG success in international markets. The EE perspective 
is stronger in its implication that entrenched BGs have neither the capability nor the incentive to 
invest internationally in a substantial way. The IV perspective, allowing for the possibility that 
BGs are functionally efficient, is perhaps slightly more open to the possibility that BGs might 
develop some international capabilities. First, the IV perspective explicitly allows for the reality 
of competitive advantages derived from BGs internal executive labour markets (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997) and intragroup technology sharing and diffusion (Chang & Hong, 2000). Second, 
others suggested that BGs might adopt more formal M-form structures to adapt to increasingly 
competitive domestic environments (Kock & Guillen, 2000). However, the primary prediction of 
BG evolution suggested that to maintain their profitability in an improving institutional 
environment BGs would re-focus their product market scope on a narrower range of activities 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Hoskisson, 2005). Few BG scholars predicted that BGs would 
develop the proprietary organizational and technological capabilities to become internationally 
competitive MNEs and the evidence regarding the internationalization of BGs is indeed mixed 
(Holmes et al, 2016). 
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 There is growing evidence that group affiliation does help firms to share information 
about foreign opportunities and to acquire advanced technology to become internationally 
competitive (Lamin, 2013; Mahmood, Zhu & Zajac, 2011). Over the past decade, scholars have 
documented the pioneering internationalization of firms from emerging markets, the emerging-
market multinationals (Matthews, 2006). There is some evidence that BG affiliation may 
contribute to the international success of these firms through a variety of mechanisms. BG 
affiliation may provide a springboard to foreign markets (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti & 
Singh, 2009; Yiu, Bruton & Lu, 2005) and allow firms to leverage the market knowledge and 
international connections of their sister affiliates (Lamin, 2013). The consensus arising from this 
stream of research is that in some situations BG affiliates are in the vanguard of economic 
development and can represent the country's most internationally competitive firms. For 
example, Siegel and Choudhury (2012) suggest that India's longest established business groups 
have become a repository for marketing and technological competences that have fuelled their 
international rise, and Chari (2013) finds that Indian affiliates of BGs were more likely to engage 
in foreign direct investment (FDI). 
On the other hand, a variety of specific mechanisms has also been identified in the EE 
literature suggesting how BG affiliation might suppress firm capacities to internationalize. First, 
controlling shareholders may undermine the competitive potential of their affiliates by extracting 
or tunneling their resources (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, 2002). In addition, oligarchic 
family BGs can use their economic power to extract resources from government (Faccio, 2006) 
through corporate bailouts (Faccio, Masulis & McConnell, 2006), rent seeking (Fisman, 2001), 
and inhibiting competition from domestic and international rivals (Fogel, 2006). Receiving an 
assured stream of rents, these business owners have limited incentive to seek investment 
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opportunities beyond their borders, where the possibilities for rent extraction are less auspicious 
and the likely returns are much lower (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen & Nielsen, 2016). Rather, they 
may prefer to diversify within their own national boundaries (Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Gaur & 
Kumar, 2009; Kumar, Gaur & Pattnaik, 2012; Pederson & Stucchi, 2014). Indeed, extensive 
political and business ties with local actors drive domestic growth, but may inhibit international 
expansion (Tan & Meyer, 2010; Chari,2013). Thus, there is some evidence supporting the 
mechanisms proposed by EE that entrenched BGs might have neither the incentive nor the 
capabilities to expand abroad.  
In summary, based on firm-level studies of BG affiliation, there is no unambiguous or 
overwhelming support for either the IV or the EE view about the impact of BG affiliation on 
firm performance; neither view can explain convincingly all the observed phenomena, and the 
findings seem to be context-specific.  
BG Prevalence: Do BGs Become Less Prevalent as Institutions Become More Developed? 
 In the IV tradition, it is argued that BGs are created and effectively fill institutional voids, 
but diminish in importance as institutions become stronger. In contrast, EE theory suggests that 
BGs become entrenched and powerful and use that power to protect their position; far from 
disappearing they persist and may become even more prevalent. The question to answer is 
therefore the following: Do we observe across countries and over time that BG prevalence tends 
to decline as institutional voids and market failures are reduced? Khanna and Yafeh (2007: 364) 
pose the question in a similar way: “Do groups evolve in a fashion that is consistent with missing 
institutions?” The literature has relatively few direct tests of this issue. 
We begin by noting that there is certainly some understanding that “BGs have typically 
defied predictions of their imminent demise surviving the conscious attempts by reform-minded 
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politicians to break them up and the impact of financial crises” (Granovetter, 2005: 445), and 
recognition of this fact has prompted researchers to address the question of why some BGs 
persist (Gao et al., 2017). In fact, BG prevalence varies widely across markets, and recent 
research shows that group affiliation remains common even in some highly-developed 
economies with strong market supporting institutions, such as Belgium, Germany, and Sweden 
(Belenzon et al., 2013).  
Turning to dynamics, studies estimating the effects of improving market supporting 
institutions on affiliate profitability in countries such as Chile (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), China 
(Carney, Shapiro & Tang, 2009), India (Zattoni, Pedersen & Kumar, 2009), and Korea (Lee, 
Peng & Lee, 2008), conclude that, consistent with the IV perspective, BG performance tends to 
deteriorate over time, albeit slowly. In contrast, studies of India and South Korea (Chittoor, Kale 
& Puranam, 2015; Kim et al., 2010; Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2015; Siegel & Choudhury, 
2012) show that affiliate performance may improve with institutional strengthening, though once 
again, this evidence refers to single countries and is similarly inferential. However, none of these 
studies provide a direct test of whether BG prevalence, defined as the extent to which the 
corporate sector is controlled by business groups (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006), actually 
declined. Zhang, Sjogren, and Kishida (2016) directly examine the emergence and persistence of 
BGs in three countries: China, Japan, and Sweden. They conclude that BGs emerge in times of 
institutional instability and tend to persist partly because of their capacity to diversify and share 
risks, though the manner in which this occurred was context-dependent.  
Carney et al (2017) provide direct estimates of trends in BG prevalence by drawing on 
data from a large number of BG studies. In Figure 1, we show BG prevalence trends for eight 
countries, calculated using linear least squares estimates. While BG prevalence may have 
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declined in some countries, as illustrated by Chile, Korea, Russia, and Turkey, there are upward 
trends in prevalence in countries such as China, India, Japan, and Taiwan. Indeed, Carney et al. 
(2017) show that BG prevalence is also increasing in Belgium, Brazil, Indonesia, Israel, 
Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, and Thailand. Generally, they do not identify any common trend in 
BG prevalence across countries or over time. Their results are not consistent with either of the 
two perspectives.  
 A longstanding research strand has focused on another important dimension: the effect of 
BG prevalence on national economic performance.  These effects have previously been assessed 
in terms of growth in industrial capacity and productivity growth (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; 
Lazzarini, 2015; Wade, 1990), often with ambiguous results (see Table 1).  The IV argument is 
simply that BGs should diminish in importance as economic development proceeds but EE 
scholars identify several mechanisms through which the relationship between the level of 
economic development and BG prevalence might be negative. One is that entrenched BGs use 
their political power to limit competition, particularly foreign competition, with its attendant 
spillover benefits (Morck, Wolfeson & Yeung, 2005); another is that they have limited 
incentives to engage in and support innovation because they seek to protect existing sources of 
rents (Chang, Chung & Mahmood, 2006; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004). The general argument is 
that high BG prevalence creates a weak competitive environment, and this undermines firm 
capabilities and incentives to engage in innovation, which in turn limits GDP growth and 
international competitiveness (Fogel, 2006; Kock & Guillen, 2001). However, Carney et al. 
(2017) find no evidence of negative relationship between BG prevalence and GDP per capita (the 
standard measure of level of development), country level innovation, as well as inward FDI or 
outward FDI.  
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Thus, BGs can remain prevalent at relatively high income countries and show no definite 
downward trend over time, as predicted by IV theory. However, the prevalence of BGs in the 
national economy does not appear to be systematically associated with poor national 
performance, as suggested by the EE perspective. The overall picture suggests that the 
persistence of BGs is widespread, albeit not in every country, and not necessarily for reasons 
associated with entrenchment. Schneider (2010: 666), on the other hand, concludes that BGs 
“often fail, which suggests important limits to theories of entrenchment and rent seeking”. Thus, 
contrary to the ‘eternal life’ (Morck, 2010) hypothesis, BGs can sometimes fail to adapt, 
collapse, and disappear.  
Figure 1: BG Prevalence Trends in 8 Countries 
Moving Forward: Reflections on BG Theory 
We have used the IV and EE perspectives as a way of organizing our analysis of the BG 
phenomenon. Contrary to the EE view, BG affiliation often enhances financial performance 
though this result is context specific. In contrast to the IV view, BGs do not automatically 
disappear as institutions strengthen; rather, BG affiliation becomes less prevalent in some 
countries, but more prevalent in others. Once again, the precise pattern is context specific. 
Moreover, there is no consistent evidence supporting a negative impact of BG prevalence on 
country variables related to growth and competitiveness. BG persistence is not necessarily 
caused by the phenomena at the heart of entrenchment theory, namely elite capture (Morck, 
Wolfeson & Yeung, 2005). Hence the observed persistence of BGs appears to be accompanied 
by context-specific adaptive BG behaviour, a phenomenon not discussed by either 
perspective.  We therefore conclude that the simple stylization in the literature into a dichotomy 
of “paragons or parasites” is too coarse, and that we need to develop frameworks capable of 
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characterizing the more complex dynamics leading to hetergoneous outcomes over time and 
across countries.  
Specifically, we require a finer grained conceptual framework that explicitly brings into 
the analysis two key elements: the national institutional context and BG adaptive strategies. It 
must also be able to accommodate a variety of potential equilibrium outcomes, including BGs 
becoming competitive internationally. We propose that the two critical determining factors for 
BG performance and persistence are the state’s capacity to create market-supporting institutions 
and the adaptability of BGs to evolving institutions. Thus, we envisage four potential equilibria, 
subsuming the two characterized by the existing theoretical approaches.  
The strength of the state 
Strong and effective political institutions underpin the functioning of market-supporting 
institutions, such as creation and enforcement of property rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; 
Haggard & Tiede, 2011). However, despite Khanna and Palepu’s (1997) exhortation that the 
state should focus on construction of market-supporting institutions, the potential role of the state 
in the evolution of BGs is not much evident in the recent literature.  The IV perspective is silent 
on the question of constructing effective political institutions that support a strong state, namely 
political accountability, bureaucratic transparency, and the rule of law. Moreover, one of the 
assumptions of the EE perspective is that, to protect their interests, elites and BG oligarchs will 
capture state institutions. Yet the growth and development of democratic political institutions can 
result in legitimate regime change (i.e. via elections) that can check the power of elites, with the 
consequence that BGs’ political connections may possess a ‘contingent value’ following regime 
change (Siegel, 2007; Sun, Mellahi & Wright, 2012).  
To sharpen the characterization, we categorize contexts between strong and weak states. 
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By state strength, we refer to the ability and commitment of governments to stimulate economic 
transformation, either through the development of market-supporting institutions or through state 
guidance and intervention, producing a form of state capitalism (Wade, 1990; Musacchio, 
Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Hallward-Driemeier and 
Pritchett (2015) also point to strong states as ones that can both create and enforce effective laws 
and regulations.  
The defining feature of the strong state is ‘embedded autonomy’, a state capacity to 
engage constructively with business elites while simultaneously maintaining freedom from 
dependence upon any particular group of elites (Evans, 1995). Autonomy implies the ability to 
formulate and realize collective goals instead of permitting individual officeholders to pursue 
their private interests, often with business elites. Strong states therefore establish meritocratic, 
bureaucracies with public officials selected through public exams (Fukuyama, 2014). The 
coherence of public bureaucracy enables the suppression of rent seeking while maintaining close 
relationships with the business elite. At the same time, the latter has the autonomy to formulate 
business group strategies that are appropriate to their evolving capabilities. 
Early accounts of BG functioning were alert to the importance of the strong state and its 
capacity for supporting economic development through the development of legal reforms, 
efficient bureaucracies and the cultivation of financial and organizational capacities in a 
country’s leading enterprises. Role models for the strong state include Japan (Johnson, 1982), 
Korea (Amsden, 1989), and Taiwan (Wade, 1990). Weak states are defined by the absence of 
embedded autonomy.  
In contrast, weak states have not evolved in this way; rather they are entrenched in rent-
seeking behavior, with control exercised by elites who exploit their political and economic power 
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for their own benefit and for the maintenance of their political stranglehold. Weak states are thus 
characterized by what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) refer to as “extractive institutions”, that 
is, institutions designed to benefit elites. Weak states may appear strong, in the sense that a 
‘strongman’ or despot is able to exercise a monopoly of power and expropriate resources, yet 
possess little capacity to establish a coherent public bureaucracy since the despot and other 
public functionaries may engage in rent-seeking. In addition, corporate elites lack the autonomy 
to realize an economic transformation.  
Although we limit our analysis to the cases of strong and weak states, we acknowledge 
the possibility of intermediate cases such as Brazil, India, or Turkey. At the same time, a state 
can transition from weak into strong by promoting market-supporting institutions and legal 
reforms that limit elite-government collusion as in China since Deng Xiao Peng, or vice versa as 
observed in Turkey under President Erdogan. 
The adaptability of the BG 
Turning to the adaptability factor, our reflections on the BG debate suggests the need for 
a framework that recognizes the possibility that some BGs can sometimes be capable of thriving 
as a group, including the ability to adjust to global opportunities and threats, as economic 
circumstances evolve. In contrast to the IV perspective, which views BGs adaptation as a 
tendency to refocus their business scope, we see a wider range of possibilities. Thus, 
reconsiderations based on recent research findings suggest that group adaptability refers to the 
aptitude of BGs for responding to changing institutional circumstances, by developing group 
wide competitive capabilities that enable them to exploit effectively the evolving opportunities. 
Based on historical and longitudinal studies in the literature, we describe three possible 
syndromes of BG adaptability: reflecting strategies of refocusing, internationalization, and 
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institutional escape respectively, each being contingent upon the shape of state institutions. 
However, some BGs may display inertia in the face of institutional change. This leads us to 
depict three further syndromes, which we describe as collapse/absorption, contingent-value, and 
capture. These possibilities are discussed in detail below in our presentation of the four 
quadrants in Figure 2. 
-Figure 2 about here- 
The matrix of outcomes of BG evolution 
These factors are summarized in Figure 2, where we have created a 2x2 matrix that shows group 
adaptability and state strength on its axes. The traditional IV and EE views are captured in the 
lower quadrants where it is assumed that BGs are non- or weakly adaptable. Thus, in strong 
states, institutional voids will be filled and when this is combined with BGs that cannot adapt by 
developing the necessary business capabilities, the result will be the demise of BGs, as discussed 
above. On the other hand, in weak states, BGs can persist and become entrenched without 
altering their non-transparent structures, as envisaged in the EE perspective. The strength of the 
business elite, in contrast to the feeble state, can lead to state capture and as we have seen may be 
an important element hindering the evolution to further institutional change. We discuss these 
cases further below. 
The cases of BG adaptability: the upper quadrants 
As we have suggested, our approach permits two additional outcomes indicated in the 
two upper quadrants of Figure 2. The upper left hand quadrant depicts the combination of a 
strong state and highly adaptable BGs which we refer to as “Competitive BGs”. Here, a strong 
state and adaptable BGs combine to produce an outcome that includes nationally and possibly 
internationally competitive business groups co-existing with populations of other types of firms 
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via strategies of refocusing and internationalization.  We identify three different mechanisms for 
the evolution of business groups within each pair of quadrants; each being associated with 
different trajectories of growth and persistence. 
We commence with refocusing, in which the horizontal or vertical scope of the BG is 
reduced by dissolving ties with peripheral affiliates so the firm increasingly focuses core 
activities (Hoskisson et al., 2005). It is most evident following an exogenous shock such as a 
financial crisis, as occurred in the wake of the Asian financial crisis when highly leveraged 
business groups shed assets to reduce their debt load (Chang, 2006). Refocusing also tends to 
follow after states adopt liberal international trade policies. Thus, the third-generation Mexican 
family business group, Cemex, had leveraged its monopoly of the domestic cement market to 
build a diversified construction, petrochemicals, mining, and tourism empire. Following the 
creation of NAFTA which threatened its business model, Cemex refocused on its original cement 
business disposing of its unrelated assets to fuel an international acquisition strategy (Lessard & 
Lucea, 2009). On the other hand, restrictions on capital outflows and international sanctions 
against South Africa's apartheid government encouraged domestic firms to adopt a diversified 
BG structure. For example, South African Breweries (SAB) diversified into non-brewing 
businesses such as clothing retail, supermarkets, hotels, and gaming. With the end of apartheid 
and capital controls, SAB refocused its activities on brewing and became an MNE through 
acquisitions (Goldstein & Prichard, 2009), but also developed an escape strategy (see below). 
Adaptation by refocusing is at first glance suggestive of the IV prediction that BGs will 
disappear through internal restructuring. However, we note that as BGs refocus and 
internationalize, they typically retain a group structure. For example, by shifting their public 
listing to foreign stock exchanges they often maintain the complex and nebulous corporate 
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structures consisting of both public and privately held entities in the manner described by 
Belenzon et al (2013). These corporate structures depart in significant ways from the standard 
model of the M-form structure comprising a single unified legal corporate entity. 
Some BGs may internationalize without refocusing. Government linked BGs, such as 
Singapore’s Temasek Holdings (Tsui-Auch & Yoshikawa, 2010) and China’s state owned BGs 
such as Sinopec (Yiu, Ng & Ma, 2013; Guest & Sutherland, 2010) have made extensive FDI for 
strategic asset seeking purposes (Yiu, Bruton & Lu, 2005). Others have internationalized in a 
more organic manner, pursuing international opportunities based upon their evolving 
capabilities, for example, with respect to innovation (Castellacci, 2015) and organizational 
learning (Lamin, 2013).  Perhaps, the archetype of this strategy is Korea's Samsung, a family 
owned business group, which has created a global brand that facilitates innovation through a 
system of corporate governance that combines both western management practices as well as a 
Japanese-style business group structure (Khanna, Song & Lee, 2011). Thus, contrary to both the 
IV and the EE perspective, such adaptation may result in improved national and international 
competitiveness, growth in the number of affiliates, and increasing group scale and scope (Siegel 
& Chowdhury, 2012; Chari & Dixit, 2015).  
Both of these evolutionary paths for BGs are contingent on the strength of the state. A 
strong state enables BG adaptation by improving market supporting institutions, but also exerts 
discipline over BGs by steadily increasing competitive pressures that incentivize productive 
adaptations; for example, by liberalizing investment and trade agreements and allowing the 
growth of both foreign and domestic freestanding firms. In the examples above, the strong states 
of Singapore and China combined with adaptable BGs to produce more focused and international 
firms. The category of Competitive BGs also includes successful BG affiliates in countries such 
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as Japan, Korea and Taiwan, as referenced in Table 1, as well as BG affiliates such as the Koc 
Group in Turkey, that compete successfully in their home markets against strong foreign 
competitors, perhaps also as a result of their reputational capital (Gao et al., 2017). In addition, 
such BGs may create spillover benefits to other firms in the home economy, an outcome not 
predicted by either the IV or the EE perspective, but, as we have noted in Table 1, sometimes 
observed in practice.  
Finally, the upper right hand quadrant depicts the combination of a weak state and highly 
adaptable BGs which we refer to as “Escape Strategy”.  In this quadrant, we observe an 
equilibrium in which adaptable BGs are operating in the context of a weak state. This situation 
may arise when there is a lack of congruence between state and industrial actors so that state 
policy may conflict with BGs interests notably in the areas of rule of law, corruption and 
protection of property rights. Thus, the political system may succeed in limiting institutional 
development, possibly to the advantage of political elites, but to the detriment of some business 
leaders, notably BGs. In this situation, the institutionally weak context of the home economy 
may not change, and state weakness will persist.   
Under these circumstances, BG adaptability may manifest itself in what we term an 
“escape strategy”, similar to that identified by Witt and Lewin (2007) and Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Ramamurti (2017). In this case, firms adapt to weak domestic institutions by moving operations 
to another country.  There are numerous instances: During the second half of the 20th Century 
newly independent postcolonial states across Africa and Asia adopted nationalist political and 
economic agendas, but often lacked the bureaucratic capacity to enact them (Tipton, 2009). As a 
result, previously friendly colonial regimes were replaced by states hostile toward foreign-owned 
BGs (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002). Many well-established groups elected to repatriate their 
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capital but continued to operate though often with different product-market strategies (Jones, 
2000). For example, during the post-independence conflict in Zimbabwe, the London and 
Rhodesia Mining Group expatriated its assets to Lonrho, an international property and trading 
company. Similarly, in postcolonial Malaysia, the timber and palm oil Borneo Group managed 
the transition to become Inchcape, a London based multinational automobile distributor (Jones, 
2000). Many of these groups survived for almost two centuries meeting their eventual demise in 
the late 1980s with the emergence of ‘anti-conglomerate sentiment’ in capital markets (Colpan & 
Jones, 2010).  
Nevertheless, these adaptable persistent groups closely resemble Morck’s (2010) ‘eternal 
life’ hypotheses. In the modern era, unanticipated regime change in countries with weak and 
unstable political institutions may precipitate a BG escape response via capital flight (e.g., 
Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). One example is SAB, referred to above, which ultimately moved its 
headquarters from South Africa to the UK.  Another example is First Pacific of Hong Kong, a 
subsidiary of Indonesia’s Salim Group, which fled Indonesia to Hong Kong after the fall of 
Suharto in 1998. UNCTAD data (2008) shows that with some $7 billion in international assets, 
First Pacific generates no revenues in Hong Kong and of its 66,000 employees, just 36 are 
located there. Similarly, the Turkish Yilditz Holdings, a BG created during the secular nationalist 
era in Turkey, became less well connected under the new Islamic political elite around Recep 
Erdogan. Turkish Yilditz Holdings has purchased Godiva in the USA and United Biscuit in the 
UK, and launched a new holding company Pladis to be quoted on the New York exchange.   
The cases of BG inertia: the lower quadrants 
We have previously suggested that both the IV and the EE perspective implicitly assume 
that BGs are non-adaptable; in the former this is combined with a strong state and in the latter 
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with a weak one. These outcomes are represented in the bottom left and right hand quadrants of 
Figure 2 respectively.  
However, we can extend the analysis and identify more finely grained categories within 
each lower quadrant, paralleling our analysis for the upper quadrants. Hence, for the case of non-
adaptability (inertia), we depict three syndromes: collapse/absorption, contingent-value and 
capture. As in the upper quadrants, these represent different mechanisms for the evolution of 
business groups within and between each quadrant; each syndrome being associated with 
different possible trajectories over time and within countries.  
The lower left hand quadrant depicts the combination of a strong state and low BG 
adaptability. Collapse/absorption refers to the failure and subsequent dissolution of a BG when 
its own inertia is combined with the emergence of a strong state, which exposes the firm to 
stronger market based competition. As market-supporting institutions are strengthened, entire 
BGs can be overwhelmed when exposed to market-based exogenous shocks. For example, the 
1997 Asian financial crisis precipitated the collapse of BGs in the worst affected countries. One 
of Thailand’s largest groups, the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) group failed (Wailerdsak 
& Suehiro, 2010).  Similarly, 13 of South Korea’s top 30 business groups were technically 
bankrupt. However, in the case of South Korea, an external crisis was used by the strong state to 
force BGs to reorganize and become more adaptive. The government stepped in to reorganize 
some of these groups, for example, Kia Group’s automobile business was absorbed by Hyundai, 
but many other BGs were dissolved and their assets spun off, including the fourth-largest group 
Daewoo, as well as five other top 30 BGs (Chang, 2006). Thus, the strong state helped BGs 
transition to become more adaptable. 
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A less catastrophic outcome also encompasses absorption into another group via merger 
or acquisition. During the 1980s, many of Hong Kong’s colonial era British owned Hongs were 
absorbed into BGs owned and controlled by local entrepreneurs; for example, Hutcheson-
Whampoa was absorbed by Li Kashing’s Chueng Kong Holdings. In Chile, there was a slow 
churning of BGs and some groups were absorbed by others – in particular older family owned 
groups, such as Endesa, were acquired by foreign owners (Larrain & Urzúa, 2016). In these 
cases, BG prevalence persists, but ownership changes facilitate a transition to more adaptable 
businesses. 
The lower right hand quadrant depicts the combination of BG inertia with a weak state in 
a trajectory of rapid ascent and decline, denoted contingent value. This syndrome is 
characterized by a patron-client relationship between political elites and business leaders, such 
that the BGs value is contingent upon the patron’s continued grip on power. The contingent 
value of these relationships is documented by Fisman (2001) who observed that the market value 
of BGs connected with the Indonesian president Suharto declined in response to reports of his ill-
health. Evidence of the contingent value of BGs political connections has been noted in a variety 
of jurisdictions (Lu & Ma, 2008; Siegel, 2007), but they are especially prominent in weak states 
that combine political instability with the prevalence of clientelism. Hawes (1992) describes the 
rise and fall of several groups associated with the Marcos regime in the Philippines and Gomez 
(2009) recounts the rapid rise and fall of Malaysia’s Renong group which, under the sponsorship 
of Malaysia’s finance minister Daim, became Malaysia’s largest BG in just five years. However, 
President Mahathir became intolerant of Daim’s wasteful patronage and he fell from favor. The 
assets of Daim’s ‘allies and proxies’ were taken over by the state to be reallocated to newly 
favored clients. Schneider (2010) refers to BGs on this trajectory as ‘Icarus Groups’ noting the 
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spectacular rise and fall of the Cruzat–Larraın and BHC groups in Chile which had especially 
close relations with the Pinochet government. The point is that, even in circumstances where 
BGs are entrenched, their positions are contingent on government patronage. 
Similarly, we identify BG capture as another non-adaptive response to, most commonly, 
regime change in a weak state. It is also the counterpart to escape when BGs are adaptable, and 
refers to cases where a BG is captured by a hostile state and the group's assets are put to new 
uses. For example, in the 1970s, Malaysia’s largest BG, British owned Sime-Derby, elected to 
remain in Malaysia but was eventually acquired by the state who used Sime-Derby as a proving-
ground designed to create an ethnic-Malaysian entrepreneurial class (Drabble & Drake, 1981). 
As part of an infrastructure-based industrial strategy, Singapore’s developmental state acquired 
foreign owned BGs, such as Guthries in the 1970s (Jones, 2000).  
Discussion 
We have argued that the empirical evidence to date does not provide unambiguous support for 
either the IV or EE approaches to BGs, with heterogeneous outcomes being observed contingent 
on time and context.  Thus, despite their ubiquity, there is much variation between BGs across 
countries, on dimensions such as forms of ownership and control, the extent of vertical 
integration and horizontal diversification, their relationships with the state, their broader 
economic welfare effects (Yiu, Lu, Bruton & Hoskisson, 2007), and their evolution over time. 
We have therefore proposed a more fine-grained and nuanced framework that permits a broader 
range of BG-related outcomes. Our framework also allows for different outcomes within a single 
country and over time, and thus permits an understanding of the dynamic evolution of BGs. In 
this discussion, we outline some of the implications of our framework for future research, 
government policy and managerial practice. The evidence suggests that BGs sometimes have the 
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ability to adapt as groups to their changing institutional context, but without necessarily 
disappearing as envisaged by the IV perspective. We suggest that future research should 
distinguish between refocused and diversified internationalizing groups, and between 
adaptability that occurs within strong and weak states. Refocusing is represented by exemplars 
such as CEMEX and SAB which have leveraged a domestically developed competitive 
advantage in a core product (cement, brewing) to enter other emerging markets, before 
developing the capabilities necessary to compete in advanced economies. Research might also 
examine the extent to which a focused internationalization strategy is accompanied by a 
structural shift toward stronger vertical and horizontal ties, such that they increasingly resemble 
the integrated M-form corporate structure, as originally suggested by Kock and Guillen (2001). 
However, as the SAB example illustrates, outward FDI can also be viewed as an adaptation to 
overcome weak home country institutions (Stoian & Mohr, 2016), and it is important for future 
research to fully articulate the dynamic interaction between firm adaptability and institutions that 
result in firms choosing to invest abroad. 
 More generally, we need to understand how and when BGs adapt to changes in the 
institutional and selection environment and whether there are policy frameworks that support 
such developments (Castellacci, 2015; Gao et al., 2017; Kock & Guillen, 2001). We observe 
considerable variation in BG adaptability. For example, some BGs in India are more likely to 
adapt to pro-market reforms and are thus a “stable and effective alternative form of organizing 
diverse businesses” (Manikandan & Ramachandran (2015), 613). Other BGs retain diversified 
portfolios and venture abroad to seek strategic assets that they can assimilate and use as a 
springboard to further expansion (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014). Notable amongst these 
are a number of Indian BGs, such as Tata, which have overcome the traditional weakness of the 
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Indian state to leverage strong competitive capabilities that they have acquired abroad across a 
diversified range of product markets. The Tata Group contains some 29 publicly listed and more 
than 100 operating companies and firms. These businesses are organized around four clusters 
that resemble the General Electric model of strategic business units designed to tap synergies and 
share common capabilities. A major new research effort is needed to understand the factors 
driving the adaptability of BGs and their choice of business strategies by documenting the 
divergent trajectories of business groups in the same institutional context.  At the same time, we 
have considered a variety of contexts in which BGs are dissolved or where troubled BGs are 
absorbed and reorganized, and this also highlights the need for further research into the causes 
and dynamics of BG evolution. 
Our framework therefore reinforces Granovetter’s (2005) call for researchers to examine 
the way BGs change and adapt over time. We need to understand better how adaptation allows 
BGs to persist in layers of co-existing corporate systems (Meuer, Rupietta & Backes-Gellner, 
2015). Thus, rather than ‘crowding out’ alternative configurations of institution and corporate 
structures, BGs may simply occupy a nodal point, albeit at times a rather prominent one, in a 
shifting and developing corporate landscape. For instance, in the manner suggested by Belenzon 
et al (2013), German corporate groups continue to coordinate industrial activities in technology 
and capital-intensive sectors of the economy alongside a large and diverse population of 
autonomous midsized Mittlelstand firms (Herrigel, 2000). Research in the VoC literature 
suggests that BG prevalence and high levels of inward FDI can produce a self-reinforcing 
dynamic resulting in strong complementarity between foreign MNEs and BGs, which together 
form a dominant stable coalition in many emerging markets (Nolte & Vliegenthart, 2009; 
Schneider, 2009). Schneider (2009) predicts that linkages and inward investments by MNEs push 
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BGs into new sectors and expand the scope of their diversification. Nolte and Vliegenthart 
(2009) depict similar dynamics in the central Europe's transitional economies, where local 
diversified BGs coalesced with MNEs to create global assembly platforms for medium-range 
consumer durables, such as auto parts and electronics. In both cases, BGs affiliated firms are 
highly prevalent alongside substantial inward FDI.   
The coexistence of foreign MNEs and domestic BGs is also consistent with the 
international business view that inbound FDI can be particularly effective in encouraging 
industrial restructuring (Dunning & Narula, 1996), which is an important antecedent of outward 
FDI by BGs (Meyer, 2006). That is, inward FDI can encourage domestic firms to be competitive. 
At the same time, it must be recognized that several East Asian economies, such as Japan and 
Korea, actively discouraged inward FDI in the early stages of development as a means of 
developing domestic capabilities (Amsden, 1989; Gerlach, 1992). Therefore, in this view, the 
relationship between levels of BG prevalence and inward FDI is ambiguous, with considerable 
heterogeneity across countries. We believe that our framework provides a potentially useful way 
to integrate the VoC and BG literatures in a more complete manner. 
Our framework also addresses recent calls to incorporate nonmarket actors, including the 
state, more effectively into global strategy research (Doh & Lucea, 2013). We argue that the 
strength of the state is the second pivotal contingency characterizing the likely path of BG 
evolution. This is consistent with the recent literature on cross-national differences in 
entrepreneurship, social, and commercial that highlights the importance of national institutions 
and state activism (recent examples include Ault & Spicer, 2014; Estrin et al., 2013a, b; Stephan 
et al., 2015).  
Importantly, these studies raise serious questions regarding how state strength and 
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activity is defined which go beyond the scope of this paper, but are significant issues to address 
in future. Explicit recognition of the state in the analysis of BG evolution also raises questions of 
causality and dynamics. One example is the recent study of industrial policy in Brazil by Mingo 
and Khanna (2014), where they clearly distinguish between a policy period and a post-policy 
period. In terms of causality, Cantwell et al (2010) and Cuervo-Cazzura (2015) point to the 
possibility that MNEs and institutions will co-evolve. Applying a co-evolutionary approach to 
BGs, Carney & Gedajlovic (2002) describe how Southeast Asian family owned BG's adapted 
their corporate structures and financial strategies to major shifts in the political environment. In 
their view, Southeast Asian BGs capacities for internal financing inhibited the growth of external 
capital markets across the region. Alternatively, in other contexts as capital markets become 
more liquid, BGs have shifted from substituting for missing capital market to performing a 
complementary role (Chittoor, Kale & Puranam, 2015) by becoming attractive investment targets 
for arm’s length investors.  
Co-evolution is certainly an avenue of exploration for future research on BGs because it 
links firm adaptability and institutional development. A co-evolutionary perspective also 
suggests that institutional development does not necessarily lock-in into a given path dependent 
course determined by initial conditions. Since both states and BG leaders are capable of forming 
new coalitions they may shift from one path to another (Evans, 1995).  
Our approach is also consistent with studies that recognize the interaction between the 
international competitiveness of a country’s prevailing organizational forms and country-level 
policies and institutions (Porter, 1990; Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). Our proposed framework 
places emphasis on the interaction between business organizations and institutions, seeking to 
understand why and when BGs can develop the organizational resilience to adapt to external 
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change, and under what circumstances they will support and embrace such change.   
Finally, in building our new framework, we have drawn on the observation that the 
evidence is not consistent with the notion of global convergence towards a ‘standard model’ 
(Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004): a population of focused, freestanding firms embedded in an 
architecture of market supporting institutions of the type found in mature liberal market 
economies. Rather, we see the persistence of the BG form as a departure from any standard 
model that perhaps is related to a world of co-existing institutional forms for firms. This notion 
of multiple equilibria resonates with the idea that a variety of institutional systems exist 
(Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera & Smith, 2016) and is consistent with the notion of more than one 
efficient variety of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), though our framework also includes 
inefficient outcomes. The idea that different forms of market economy and of firms can co-exist 
and successfully compete with each other significantly increases the degrees of freedom 
available to policy makers in designing development strategies. Moreover, firms operating on 
global markets need to be aware that they may find themselves competing with organisations 
with a very different internal architecture and system of resource allocation to their own, and 
therefore willing and able to follow strategies outside their own choice set. 
Thus, our framework also has important implications for policy makers and practitioners. 
For example, it may not be appropriate to judge all potential corporate forms according to a 
single yardstick; in certain circumstances, the BG form may provide a basis for strong national 
economic performance and value for shareholders comparable to the focused companies 
characterizing most mature market economies. For policy makers, this implies that BGs may not 
necessarily be a constraint on economic development, as envisaged in the EE perspective; rather 
when BG adaptability is combined with a state actively building market supporting institutions, 
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BGs may provide an efficient mechanism for economic development at home and for 
internationalization. For managers of Western multinationals, it provides a warning that, while 
BGs may not have an organizational structure and governance arrangements with which they are 
familiar, there remain circumstances in which they may still be highly effective competitors on 
the global stage.   
Conclusion 
Business groups are a prominent feature of the business landscape not only in developing 
countries, where they have been accorded more attention, but also in more mature economies. 
Nevertheless, their performance and persistence, remain unsettled areas of research. We find no 
consistent evidence to support either side of the competing “paragons or parasites” narrative. 
Rather, the evidence that we have assembled suggests that this polarized characterization is too 
coarse; the two apparently competing narratives should be seen as potential outcomes of a 
broader framework. We have proposed a more fine-grained analysis by introducing two new 
categories based on the capacity of the state to create market-supporting institutions and the 
ability of BGs to adapt to changes in their institutional environment. The empirical implications 
of our model point to the identification of the specific institutional contingencies that contribute 
to differences in BG prevalence and performance.  
The evidence suggests that there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity over time in 
both BG performance and prevalence. Thus, we present a theoretical approach to BGs in which 
there are multiple potential outcomes and there is no automatic convergence to a standard global 
model. As a prevalent economic and social institution, BGs are likely to bear a complex and 
multifaceted relationship with their host economies, and we suspect the identification of their 
merits and failings will occupy corporate governance, political economy, organizational 
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dynamics, and international business scholars for some time to come.  
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Table 1: Forty years of business group research 
 
Time period & Context  Theory & Findings 
Period: 1870-1914 
 
Context: First major wave of international 
trade and investment between Europe and 
colonial Southeast Asia, India, Africa, and 
Latin America. 
 
 
 
Modernization and industrialization of Japan. 
Business historians describe prototype BGs from this period as ‘agency houses’ 
(Drabble & Drake, 1981), ‘investment groups’ (Chapman, 1985) ‘expatriate firms’ 
(Davenport-Hines & Jones, 1989), and ‘business groups’ (Jones & Wale, 1998). These 
organizations monitored, traded, and performed financing, logistical, and shipping 
functions for freestanding companies (Wilkins, 1988) and engaged in international 
mining, commodity production, trading activities. Mostly founded in the late 19th 
Century but with post-WWII decline of colonialism these BGs disappeared or evolved 
into integrated multinational enterprises (Jones, 2000).  
 
Japan's modernizing state facilitates the emergence of family controlled Zaibatsu BGS 
in this period. Zaibatsu imitate selected Western management practice and followed the 
colonial era BGs forming international trading divisions in East and Southeast Asia 
(Morikawa, 1992). 
Period: 1970s 
 
Context: Concern with economic 
backwardness (Gershenkron, 1962) in less 
developed countries (LDC).  
 
Identification and support for an indigenous 
capitalist class in LDC and postcolonial 
societies.  
 
 
Described as 'Economic groups' or grupos económicos, BGs generate developmental 
externalities based on scarce entrepreneurial insight in Latin American postcolonial 
countries lacking an indigenous capitalist class (Leff, 1978). Nicaraguan family- and 
bank-based business groups provide a range of services to their affiliates (Strachan, 
1976).  
 
Grupos económicos appear dynamic in the early stages of the life cycle, but as they 
age, they lapse into a defensive mode seeking political protection and rent seeking 
(Strachan, 1976). Big family business houses are widespread in postcolonial South 
Asian societies and instrumental in promoting ‘partial’ modernization (Papanek, 1972). 
BGs solve the development problem in LDCs, but generate the new problem of the 
LDC ‘robber baron’ (Leff, 1979). 
 
Period: 1980s-1996 
 
Economic development scholars and sociologists identify state-led industrialization 
with active state role in coordinating and channeling capital to diversified BGs in Japan 
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Context: Recognition of ‘East Asian 
Economic Miracle’ in Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and later China. 
 
The developmental state. 
 
Global liberalization of trade investment 
regime.  
The growing international division of labor, 
global commodity chains. 
 
(Johnson, 1982; Gerlach, 1992), South Korea (Amsden, 1989), Taiwan (Wade, 1990), 
and later China (Keister, 1998).  
 
A few BG studies appear that identify the role of network organizational structure 
(Lincoln et al., 1996, and resource sharing in Japanese and Korean BGs (Goto, 1982; 
Chang & Choi, 1988). 
 
Main findings show that BGs promote firm growth and generate industrial capacity. 
Very few studies focus on relative financial performance (e.g., Weinstein & Yafeh, 
1995; Ferris et al., 1995).  
 
Dissenting perspectives suggest BGs are rent-seeking capitalists who impede economic 
development (Evans, 1989; Yoshihara, 1988).  
Period: 1997-2005 
 
Context: Asian financial crisis and recovery. 
 
Identification of BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) as key emerging 
markets. 
 
Information technology boom. 
 
Acceleration of outsourcing, ‘hollowing out’ 
of Western corporations. 
 
 
 
  
Surge in BG literature. Two broad directions identifying diverging positive and 
negative BG attributes. 
 
Influential theoretical and empirical studies introduce positive perspective of BG 
capacities for filling institutional voids in India (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a) and Chile 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). Performance consequences of BG affiliation in several 
emerging markets (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Growing management literature on BG 
structure and resource acquisition and sharing (Chang & Hong, 2000; Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 2002; Guillen, 2000; Yiu et al., 2005), BG refocusing as a response to 
institutional development (Hoskisson et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2004). Literature 
published primarily in management and strategy journals. 
 
Influential theoretical and empirical studies introduce a negative perspective reporting 
agency problems with BGs corporate governance structures (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
Costs and benefits of BG affiliation (Claessens et al., 2002; Perotti & Gelfer, 2001; 
Weinstein & Yafeh 1998) specify several mechanisms used to exploit minority 
investors including pyramids, tunneling, and related party transactions (Bertrand et al., 
2002; Friedman, Johnson and Mitton, 2003). A variety of specific performance effects 
of BGs are analysed, often negative and usually published in economics and finance 
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 journals; for example on tunelling (Bae et al., 2002) or risk sharing (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2005).  
 
Literature in the post-1997 period is heavily focused on the relative performance of BG 
affiliates. Meta-analysis identifies 141 studies from 28 countries containing estimates 
of affiliate performance (Carney et al., 2011). Results show that BG affiliates slightly 
underperform unaffiliated firms, but BG affiliates do better in less developed 
institutional contexts.  
 
Mid-decade literature surveys identify continuing contradictory evidence about BG 
performance and attributes (Granovetter, 2005; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Morck et al., 
2005).   
  
Period: Post 2005 
 
 
Context: Economic shocks and financial 
crises. 
 
Growing number of emerging markets attain 
middle-income and advanced economy status 
(e.g., Israel. Korea, Taiwan).  
 
Increasing numbers of emerging market firms 
listed among the world's largest 500 
multinational enterprises. 
 
 
 
New streams of research emerge in the BG literature:  
 
Consistent with a positive BG perspective, research focuses on BGs’ ability to develop 
international competitive advantage through networks (Elango et al., 2007; Mahmood 
et al., 2008), innovation (Belezon & Berkovitz, 2010; Castellacci, 2010; Chang et al., 
2006), and increasing international scope (Lamin, 2012; Ayyagari et al., 2015).  
 
The literature also tests specific components of the IV and EE perspectives  for 
example, concerning whether controlling shareholders “tunnel” resources from 
minority shareholders (Masulis, Phan & Zein, 2011; Siegel & Choudhury, 2012) or 
whether BGs maintain efficient internal capital (Boutina et al., 2013) and labor markets 
(Belenzon & Tsolmon, 2016; Cestone et al., 2016).  
 
Consistent with a negative BG perspective, research identifying extraction through 
coinsurance and related party transactions with positive (Cheung, 2006; Jia et al., 2012) 
and negative effects of diversification (Chakrabarti et al., 2007). Documentation of 
BGs negative social consequences (Fogel, 2006). Continued recommendations for 
dismantling of BGs (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006).   
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Country-specific longitudinal studies show that BGs performed well before economic 
reforms, but demonstrated declining performance in post-reform period (Chari & 
Parthiban, 2012; Kim et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2008; Zattoni et al., 2009). Contrarily, 
other country-specific longitudinal surveys show that BGs perform better after 
institutional reforms (Chittoor et al., 2015; Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2015; Siegel 
& Choudhury, 2012), suggesting that BGs adapt by shifting from a void filling function 
toward a complementary function.  
 
Emergence of research suggesting that BGs experience complex and contingent 
political relationships (Lu & Ma, 2008; Siegel, 2007; Zhu & Chung, 2014), as well as 
research identifying factors supporting BG persistence during and after institutional 
transitions regardless of performance consequences (Chung & Luo, 2013; Schneider, 
2010).  
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Table 2: The Institutional Void (IV) and Entrenchment/Exploitation (EE) Perspectives 
Compared 
 Institutional Voids 
(IV) 
Entrenchment/ 
Exploitation 
(EE) 
Main Idea BGs arise as efficient internal 
organizational responses to 
inefficient or missing external 
markets (“institutional voids”). 
BGs arise because business 
elites use political connections 
to obtain preferential and 
protected access to resources. 
Main Mechanisms 1. BGs use efficient internal 
capital and managerial markets 
to create and grow efficient 
affiliates. 
2. BGs use efficient internal 
labour markets to allocate 
personnel across businesses. 
3. BGs develop recognized 
brands that signal quality and 
reliability. 
1. BGs use political 
connections to gain monopoly 
control over critical resources 
and sectors. 
2. BGs use their political 
connections to restrict 
competition, both internal and 
external, and to obtain 
favorable regulations. 
3. BGs exploit opaque 
ownership structures to divert 
funds from affiliates to the 
ultimate owner (“tunneling”), 
often at the expense of 
minority shareholders. 
Implication: Affiliate 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence 
Affiliates of BGs will perform 
better than non-affiliated 
companies, particularly at 
lower levels of institutional 
development, across a wide 
range of economic and 
financial indicators. 
Affiliates of BGs do not out-
perform comparable non-
affiliated firms across a wide 
range of economic and 
financial indicators because 
profits are diverted from the 
affiliate. 
The evidence is mixed, with no unambiguous support for either 
perspective. BG affiliation on average has a negative or zero 
impact on performance on many measures, but there is 
considerable heterogeneity in outcomes, depending, for example, 
on the measure, the time period and the countries under 
consideration. 
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Implication: 
Internationalization 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence 
Not entirely comfortable with 
internationalization because 
BGs are not expected to 
persist, but efficient affiliates 
may develop the internal 
capabilities to compete abroad. 
BGs are more interested in 
maintaining favored positions 
in domestic markets and will 
therefore not expand abroad. 
The evidence on balance favors the IV view, but with some 
nuance. There is increasing evidence that BG affiliates do 
compete abroad and use the BG network to learn how to compete 
abroad. However, there is also evidence that the most 
domestically diversified BGs do not invest abroad. 
Implication: Business 
Group Prevalence 
 
 
 
 
Evidence 
BGs will be prevalent as long 
as market and other institutions 
are weak, but will tend to 
dissolve as institutional voids 
are filled. BG prevalence will 
decline with institutional 
development. 
BGs will become entrenched 
because they benefit from, and 
support, political elites. There 
will be no tendency for them to 
become less prevalent with 
institutional development. 
On balance, BGs tend to persist and this result is consistent with 
the EE view. However, once again, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in outcomes, so that, while in most cases BG 
prevalence does not diminish over time, there are important 
exceptions. 
Implication: Business 
Group Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence 
BGs may develop innovative 
capabilities, both internally and 
through spillovers from foreign 
firms. As such, they will not 
necessarily resist foreign entry 
and may themselves engage in 
international operations. Thus, 
BGs may enhance outward and 
inward FDI and innovation at 
the national level. BG 
prevalence is not negatively 
associated with inward and 
outward FDI and innovation at 
the national level. 
BGs are mostly interested in 
maintaining and protecting 
favored positions in the 
domestic markets. There is no 
incentive for them to engage in 
innovation because higher 
profits can be earned through 
political channels at home. 
Similarly, BGs will seek to 
limit foreign entry (inward 
FDI) and will not seek to invest 
abroad. BG prevalence is 
negatively associated with 
inward and outward FDI and 
innovation at the national level. 
There is limited evidence on the impact of BG prevalence on 
country-level outcomes. However, what evidence does not 
suggest that BG prevalence is in any way associated with 
outcomes that are consistent with the EE view. 
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Figure 1: BG Prevalence 
Figure 1a: Increasing BG Prevalence in 4 Countries* 
 
*BG prevalence also increases in Belgium, Brazil, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, 
and Thailand 
 
Figure 1b: Decreasing BG Prevalence in 4 Countries* 
 
*BG prevalence also decreases in Hong Kong and Philippines 
Source: adapted from Carney et al (2017). 
Figure 2: State Strength and Business Group Adaptability: The Outcome Matrix  
 
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
0.900
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
China
India
Japan
Taiwan
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
0.900
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Chile
Russia
South Korea
Turkey
Page 51 of 52 Academy of Management Perspectives
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitive BGs: BGs persist and 
become nationally and possibly 
internationally competitive as 
institutional voids are closed. BGs 
coexist with, and complement, 
other ownership structures 
Modes of Group Adaptability: 
Refocusing, Internationalization 
 
Escape strategies: BGs invest 
abroad to benefit from stronger 
institutional environments. In very 
weak states, some may exit the home 
jurisdiction in favor of locations 
with stronger property rights 
Mode of Group Adaptability: 
Escape 
 
 
IV perspective: BGs disappear over 
time as institutional voids are 
closed 
 
Non-Adaptation Syndrome: 
Collapse/Absorption 
 
 
 
EE perspective: BGs capture state 
actors to protect monopoly rents 
 
Non-Adaptation Syndromes: 
Capture, Contingent Value 
 
 
Strong                                                                Weak 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
Group 
Adaptability 
State Strength 
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